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“THE MERE ALLUSION TO GENDER”:  ANSWERING THE 
CHARGE THAT MARRIAGE IS SEX DISCRIMINATION 
WILLIAM C. DUNCAN* 
The Many Questions of Civil Unions 
A Symposium Addressing the Impact of Civil Unions 
February 15, 2002 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The argument that marriage is used as a form of sex discrimination has 
been made for a long time.  Significantly, however, no court accepted the 
claim until 1993 when the Hawaii Supreme Court agreed in Baehr v. Lewin 
with this sex discrimination argument.1  The court held that (1) under the 
Hawaii Constitution, any sex distinction is subject to strict scrutiny; and (2) 
since the marriage statute took the sex of the parties into consideration, it 
violated the Constitution.2  The court remanded Baehr to trial to give the State 
an opportunity to prove a compelling interest in order to justify the 
discrimination.3  Since Baehr, only one other trial court has accepted the sex 
discrimination argument.4  Both decisions, however, were overruled by a 
constitutional amendment.5  More interestingly, in Baker v. Vermont, the 
Vermont Supreme Court refused to base its decision on equal protection 
grounds.6 
Vermont’s approval of civil unions has raised the possibility of many states 
soon being faced with the issue of whether to legally recognize same-sex 
unions.  Since some advocates claim that marriage is a form of sex 
discrimination, this argument may soon gain new momentum.  For example, 
 
* Acting Director of the Marriage Law Project, Columbus School of Law, The Catholic 
University of America.  This article is based on a presentation at a symposium on the effect of 
Vermont civil unions held in February 2002.  Other presentations from the symposium will be 
published in the Widener Journal of Law and Policy. 
 1. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). 
 2. Id. at 62. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562CI, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska 
Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998). 
 5. See id.; see also Baehr, 852 P.2d 44. 
 6. Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 880 n.13 (Vt. 1999). 
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the question is also presently being discussed in Massachusetts.  A lawsuit is 
currently pending before the Massachusetts Court of Appeals in which seven 
same-sex couples have sued the State in an attempt to force the Department of 
Public Health to issue marriage licenses to them.7  An identical suit is pending 
before the New Jersey Superior Court.  Such a decision would redefine the 
concept of marriage in the Commonwealth. 
Paul Linton has made a helpful contribution in the effort to answer the 
charge that marriage is a form of sex discrimination.8  His article provides a 
very detailed description of the current legal status of this issue in jurisdictions 
where the state constitution contains an “Equal Rights Amendment” (“ERA”) 
forbidding sex-based discrimination. 
From the law of these states, as Mr. Linton describes, I have identified at 
least three alternatives through which a marriage statute or policy can escape 
the charge of sex discrimination.  Each option supports the claim that marriage 
is not a form of sex discrimination.  The same arguments also apply to laws or 
policies that provide marriage benefits only to married couples.  Thus, these 
options respond to requests for recognition of quasi-marital statuses such as 
Vermont civil unions.  Of course, while these concepts overlap, each concept 
will be discussed in turn for purposes of organization. 
II.  INHERENT DIFFERENCES 
Caselaw in states having constitutional Equal Rights Amendments 
(“ERAs”) often recognize that a law or policy employing a sex classification 
does not constitute sex discrimination if based on real, physical differences 
between the sexes.9  For example, a Texas court said: “For us to adjudicate that 
women are men would be as futile as it would be absurd.  Neither the ERA nor 
the rights established by it require us to construe it so as to deny sexual or 
reproductive differences between the sexes.”10 
For example, a number of state courts have heard challenges to statutory 
rape laws that apply only to males or for which males are given a more severe 
punishment.  These challenges, however, have been rejected.  The physical 
differences between men and women make them not similarly situated since 
 
 7. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, No. 01-1647-A (Sup. Ct. Mass. County 2002); Gays 
Sue N.J. for Marriage, NEWSDAY, June 27, 2002, at A17.  The trial court decision of the 
Massachusetts case summarily dismissed the plaintiffs’ sex discrimination claim.  Goodridge, No. 
01-1647-A at *15 n. 6. 
 8. Paul Linton, Same-Sex “Marriage” Under State Equal Rights Amendments, 46 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 911 (2002). 
 9. See People v. Salinas, 551 P.2d 703, 706 (Colo. 1976) (en banc) (noting that the ERA 
“does not prohibit differential treatment among the sexes when . . . that treatment is reasonably 
and genuinely based on physical characteristics unique to just one sex”). 
 10. Mercer v. Bd. of Trs., 538 S.W.2d 201, 206 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976). 
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women stand to suffer more as a result of an unwed pregnancy.11  Similarly, 
courts have recognized definitions of rape that implicate only men as 
perpetrators.12 
Physical differences between men and women have also been cited as 
reasons for upholding statutes that prohibit “topless” dancing by women but 
not men.13  Sex differences have also been used to justify laws providing 
different punishments for the crime of incest for men and women,14 differences 
in inheritance depending on whether a child was inheriting from her mother or 
father,15 restrictions on abortion funding,16 distinctions in ages of majority,17 
restrictions on unemployment benefits offered to pregnant persons,18 
requirements of consent for mothers but not fathers of illegitimate children 
prior to adoption,19 and allowance of initiating paternity actions by mothers but 
not fathers.20 
Existing marriage laws are likewise based on inherent differences between 
men and women.  Courts and judges recognized the nature of marriage as a 
male-female community that results from these sex differences and that makes 
same-sex marriage impossible.  A Washington court, in rejecting a claim for 
the constitutional right to a same-sex marriage, stated that plaintiffs were “not 
being denied entry into marriage because of their sex; rather, they are being 
denied entry into the marriage relationship because of the recognized definition 
of that relationship as one which may be entered into only by two persons who 
are members of the opposite sex.”21  A Kentucky case also rejected the right to 
a same-sex marriage, holding that “appellants are prevented from marrying, 
not by the statutes of Kentucky . . . but rather by their own incapability of 
entering into a marriage as that term is defined.”22  A Minnesota marriage case 
 
 11. See Salinas, 551 P.2d at 703; State v. Bell, 377 So. 2d 303 (La. 1979); State v. 
Housekeeper, 588 P.2d 139 (Utah 1978); see also Michael M. v. Super. Ct., 450 U.S. 464 (1981). 
 12. See People v. Medrano, 321 N.E.2d 97 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974); State v. Fletcher, 341 So. 2d 
340 (La. 1976); Brooks v. State, 330 A.2d 670 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975); State v. Craig, 545 
P.2d 649 (Mont. 1976); Finley v. State, 527 S.W.2d 553 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975). 
 13. See Dydyn v. Dep’t of Liquor Control, 531 A.2d 170 (Conn. App. Ct. 1987); MJR’s Fare 
of Dallas, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 792 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. App. 1990); Messina v. State, 904 S.W.2d 
178 (Tex. App. 1995); City of Seattle v. Buchanan, 584 P.2d 918 (Wash. 1978) (en banc). 
 14. See, e.g., People v. Boyer, 349 N.E.2d 50 (Ill. 1976). 
 15. See, e.g., Lowell v. Kowalski, 405 N.E.2d 135 (Mass. 1980). 
 16. See, e.g., Fischer v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 502 A.2d 114 (Pa. 1985). 
 17. See, e.g., Stanton v. Stanton, 517 P.2d 1010 (Utah 1974), rev’d on other grounds, 421 
U.S. 7 (1975). 
 18. See, e.g., Turner v. Dep’t of Employment Sec., 531 P.2d 870 (Utah 1975), vacated and 
remanded on other grounds, 423 U.S. 44 (1975). 
 19. See, e.g., Swyane v. L.D.S. Soc. Serv., 795 P.2d 637 (Utah 1990); cf. Nguyen v. 
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 533 U.S. 53 (2001). 
 20. See A v. X, Y, & Z, 641 P.2d 1222 (Wyo. 1982). 
 21. Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1192 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974). 
 22. Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973). 
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contrasts the marriage statute at issue with anti-miscegenation laws on the 
basis that the latter is a “marital distinction based merely upon race” while the 
former is “based upon the fundamental difference in sex.”23  Finally, a judge in 
the D.C. Court of Appeals noted that “same-sex ‘marriages’ are legally and 
factually—i.e. definitionally—impossible.”24 
As recognized in many ERA cases, one of the most significant 
manifestations of these sex-based differences is reproductive capacity.  As a 
Utah court noted, “[i]n the matter of pregnancy there is no way to find equality 
between men and women.”25  Indeed some courts have pointed to the unique 
procreative capacity of male-female sexual relations as the basis for the 
inherent opposite-sex nature of marriage.  One Washington court specifically 
points to reproductive capacity as a “unique physical characteristic of the 
sexes” that protects marriage from the claim of sex discrimination.26  In a 
federal case asking for recognition of same-sex marriage for immigration 
purposes, the court recognized procreation as the source of the state’s interest 
in marriage and the reason why the “legal concept and definition of . . . 
marriage” precludes same-sex couples.27 
The inherent difference between men and women is abundantly clear in the 
reality of reproduction.  A sexual relationship between a man and a woman can 
naturally (even if contrary to the intention of the participants) lead to the 
conception of a child.  A same-sex relationship never can.28  As Professor 
Teresa Collett has observed, women have a vulnerability in an opposite-sex 
relationship that does not exist in a same-sex relationship due to the 
impossibility of procreation resulting from sexual relations in the latter.  
Similar to the laws and policies reflecting sex differences upheld under state 
ERAs, marriage laws take this procreative reality into account. 
The reality of the dual-sex nature of procreation and other differences 
between the sexes underscore the fact that marriage cannot be a form of sex 
discrimination.  Rather, marriage is based on real differences between the 
sexes.  As Justice Ginsburg has noted: “Physical differences between men and 
women, however, are enduring: ‘[T]he two sexes are not fungible; a 
 
 23. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 187 (Minn. 1971). 
 24. Dean v. Dist. of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 361 (D.C. 1995) (Terry, J., concurring). 
 25. Turner v. Dep’t of Employment Sec., 531 P.2d 870, 871 (Utah 1975), vacated and 
remanded on other grounds, 423 U.S. 44 (1975). 
 26. Singer, 522 P.2d at 1195. 
 27. Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (C.D. Cal. 1980). 
 28. Singer, 522 P.2d at 1195 (“[I]t is apparent that no same-sex couple offers the possibility 
of the birth of children by their union.  Thus the refusal of the state to authorize same-sex 
marriage results from such impossibility of reproduction rather than from invidious 
discrimination ‘on account of sex.’”). 
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community made up exclusively of one [sex] is different from a community 
composed of both.’”29 
Objections have been made to this argument, however.  For example, some 
argue that the weakened link between marriage and procreation lessens the 
difference between same and opposite-sex couples.  The problem with this 
objection is that the weakened link does not (and cannot) erase that difference.  
The biological reality that the two kinds of couples do not have equal 
procreative capacities cannot be altered by assisted reproductive technology or 
changing sexual mores.  Nor is the relevance of this difference defeated by the 
fact that opposite-sex couples are allowed to marry even if not capable of 
having children, since an effort to determine an opposite-sex couple’s fertility 
would surely raise other constitutional concerns.30 
The other objection is really not an objection, but an imputation of bad 
faith.  It relies on the fact that the Virginia courts, reversed by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Loving v. Virginia,31 rested their decision on the false 
ground that marriage was inherently a single race institution.32  In Loving, the 
Supreme Court did not, though, rule that marriage was without an inherent 
nature, since it correctly held that race was not intrinsic to marriage.  The law 
reasonably rejects racial distinctions while it accepts sex distinctions based on 
biological sexual differences.  The bald absurdity of the Virginia courts’ 
argument is indicated by the fact that the law at issue in Loving did not prohibit 
all interracial marriages, only those involving whites.33 
A more fundamental problem with the Loving analogy is that, in treating 
race and sex as completely analogous, it treats men and women as fungible.  
As such, this approach ignores an appropriate concept, as articulated by a 
Texas court, that “[t]he mere allusion to gender is not a talisman of 
constitutional invalidity.”34  The Hawaii Supreme Court, however, does treat 
gender as such a constitutional trigger.  Simply because a marriage law 
mentioned sex was enough for the court to automatically judge it as 
discriminatory.  This assumption is a severe misunderstanding of the concept 
of sex discrimination and of the reality of sex differences, as discussed above.  
Most courts seem to realize this. 
 
 29. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 553 (1996) (quoting Ballard v. United States, 
329 U.S. 187, 193 (1946)) (internal citations omitted). 
 30. Adams, 486 F. Supp. at 1124-25 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)). 
 31. 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 32. In this regard, the Hawaii Supreme Court plurality opinion characterizes the Attorney 
General’s argument regarding the inherent nature of marriage as “circular.”  Baehr v. Lewin, 852 
P.2d 44, 63 (Haw. 1993). 
 33. Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support 
of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 49, Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, (Sup. 
Ct. Mass. County 2001) (No. 01-1647-A). 
 34. Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349, 359 (Tex. App. 2001) (en banc). 
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One commentator claims that the marriage statutes are discriminatory 
because they are based on stereotypes about the proper roles of men and 
women.35  This also ignores the real sex differences which marriage laws 
reflect.  The sex differences that underlie marriages, such as procreative 
capacity, are not just social constructs. 
III.  EQUAL APPLICATION 
A statute or policy might also avoid being challenged as providing for sex 
discrimination if applied equally to both sexes.36  For instance, in states with 
ERAs, courts have rejected challenges to laws that may have a disparate 
impact on one sex, even if the statute is nonetheless neutral regarding sex.37  
Thus, a law that did not provide for a presumption in favor of an even property 
division upon divorce was upheld even though it was allegedly harmful to 
women.38  A challenge to the classification of certain diseases for purposes of 
Worker’s Compensation benefits reached the same result.39  A similar decision 
was made in cases challenging a ban on public funding for abortions.40  
Moreover, in another case, the Seventh Circuit held that a “separate but equal” 
policy in regards to boys and girls school sports teams would not likely violate 
the state ERA.41  Finally, at least two state courts have upheld bans on massage 
parlors that allow opposite-sex massages.42 
A few cases have held that in order for an ERA challenge to be successful, 
the plaintiff must show a discriminatory intent.  For instance, the Montana 
Supreme Court said, “it is a basic equal protection principle that the invidious 
quality of a law claimed to be discriminatory must ultimately be traced to an 
impermissibly discriminatory purpose.”43  A Texas court of appeals likewise 
 
 35. Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex 
Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197, 218 (1994). 
 36. See Steffa v. Stanley, 350 N.E.2d 886 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (upholding interspousal tort 
immunity); see also Turner v. Dep’t of Employment Sec., 531 P.2d 870, 871 (Utah 1975), 
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 423 U.S. 44 (1975) (“It is just as bad to treat unequal 
things as equals as it is to treat equal things unequally.”); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 
540 (1942) (“The Constitution does not require things which are different in fact or opinion to be 
treated in law as if they were the same.”). 
 37. See Commonwealth v. King, 372 N.E.2d 196 (Mass. 1997) (rejecting equal protection 
challenge to prostitution statute based on argument that most prostitutes are female). 
 38. See Wendt v. Wendt, 757 A.2d 1225 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000). 
 39. See Sherman v. Pella Corp., 576 N.W.2d 312 (Iowa 1998). 
 40. See Fischer v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 502 A.2d 114 (Pa. 1985). 
 41. See O’Connor v. Bd. of Educ., 645 F.2d 578 (7th Cir. 1981); see also Att’y Gen. v. 
Mass. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 393 N.E.2d 284 (Mass. 1979). 
 42. See Laspino v. Rizzo, 398 A.2d 1069 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1979); Redwood Gym v. Salt 
Lake County Comm’n, 624 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1981). 
 43. State v. Spina, 982 P.2d 421, 437 (Mont. 1999). 
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upheld a sodomy statute against an equal protection challenge by noting a lack 
of any discriminatory intent on the basis of sex in the legislation.44 
Laws that define marriage as a relationship between a man and a woman 
also treat both sexes equally and do not constitute sex discrimination.  The 
most serious problem with challenging the definition of marriage as a form of 
sex discrimination is the failure of those making the claim to identify the class 
victimized by the discrimination since the concept of “victimless 
discrimination” is untenable.  Putting aside the separate claim of “sexual 
orientation” discrimination, there is no clear class that is being harmed by 
marriage laws.  Both men and women are treated equally by marriage laws 
since both have an equal opportunity to contract into marriage and neither sex 
is disadvantaged.  Sometimes a charge of discrimination is made in an 
imprecise way that seems to identify the couple as the relevant class.  Thus, 
one of the most significant statements related to sex discrimination is, as 
follows: “If Lucy is permitted to marry Fred, but Ricky may not marry Fred, 
then (assuming that Fred would be a desirable spouse for either) Ricky is being 
discriminated against because of his sex.”45  Of course, identifying the affected 
class as a couple does not accord with the traditional analysis of constitutional 
claims, which are pursued in terms of individual rights.  In addition, such a 
classification is not responsive to the question of which sex, men or women, is 
disadvantaged by the marriage law.  Unless same-sex couples, as couples, are 
identified as a discrete sex, one cannot help but think that this argument is 
really just a way of disguising a “sexual orientation” discrimination claim as a 
sex discrimination claim.46 
Many early cases rejecting claims in favor of same-sex marriages noted the 
equal treatment of men and women by marriage laws as a reason for not 
finding the law to discriminate on the basis of sex.  The Washington case noted 
that neither men nor women were allowed by its marriage statute to marry a 
person of the same-sex.47  In the D.C. case, Judge Steadman noted that “[t]he 
marriage statute applies equally to men and women.”48  Even the Vermont civil 
unions case noted that “marriage laws are facially neutral; they do not single 
 
 44. Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349 (Tex. App. 2001) (en banc). 
 45. See Koppelman, supra note 35, at 208.  It is interesting to note the parenthetical 
comment which may be suggesting an “inappropriateness of spouse” exception to the proposed 
sex discrimination standard. 
 46. At least one court has specifically held that sex discrimination does not include “sexual 
orientation” discrimination since “sexual orientation” is not tied to a particular gender.  In re 
Opinion of the Justices, 530 A.2d 21, 24 (N.H. 1987). 
 47. Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1190-91 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (agreeing with the state 
that since marriage licenses were denied equally to both male and female couples that there was 
no ERA violation). 
 48. Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 363 n.2 (D.C. 1995) (Steadman, J., 
concurring). 
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out men or women as a class for disparate treatment, but rather prohibit men 
and women equally from marrying a person of the same sex . . . each sex is 
equally prohibited from precisely the same conduct.”49 
The main objection to the use of the equal application doctrine in the 
marriage context, again, is an attempt to classify those who make it as bigots 
by analogizing the sex difference inherent in marriage with the discredited 
racial restrictions of past marriage laws in some states (the Loving analogy).  
This has become a particularly significant charge since it was endorsed by the 
Hawaii Supreme Court in its decision accepting the sex discrimination 
argument.50  The argument is simple: marriage laws may treat men and women 
equally, but defenders of miscegenation statutes said that those laws treated 
both races equally.  The distinction between sex and race is thus ignored by the 
court, though other courts have noted that Loving primarily regards race 
discrimination and so is not appropriate to the discussion of same-sex 
marriage.51  In addition, as noted above, the statute at issue in Loving did not 
treat all races equally, but singled out whites as a superior class. 
IV.  INTENT OF AMENDMENT 
A final category of defenses to a sex discrimination claim is the argument 
that the ERA was not intended to create the right asserted in these cases.  For 
instance, the Illinois Supreme Court held that “the purpose of the [ERA] was to 
guarantee rights for females equal to those of males.”52  A sponsor of the 
Illinois ERA said, “I don’t see any significant change that will disturb one’s 
way of life brought about by this amendment.”53  Similar statements of intent 
have been made in reference to the ERAs introduced in New Mexico,54 
Pennsylvania55 and Washington.56 
The purpose of state ERAs is also consistent with marriage laws that 
define marriage as the union of a man and a woman, since there is no reason to 
believe that the laws reflect any intent to discriminate against either men or 
women.  In the Washington same-sex marriage case, the court held that the 
state ERA could not be construed to allow for the redefinition of marriage 
because the purpose of the law was “to overcome discriminatory legal 
 
 49. Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 880 n.13 (Vt. 1999); see also Baehr v. Lewin, 852 
P.2d 44, 71 (Haw. 1993). 
 50. Baehr, 82 P.2d at 63. 
 51. See Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 187 (Minn. 1971); Singer, 522 P.2d at 1191. 
 52. People v. Ellis, 311 N.E.2d 98, 100 (Ill. 1974). 
 53. V RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 3672 
(1972). 
 54. N.M. Right to Choose/NARAL v. Johnson, 975 P.2d 841 (N.M. 1998). 
 55. See Hopkins v. Blanco, 320 A.2d 139 (Pa. 1974); Henderson v. Henderson, 327 A.2d 60 
(Pa. 1974). 
 56. See Marchioro v. Chaney, 582 P.2d 487 (Wash. 1978), aff’d 442 U.S. 191 (1979). 
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treatment as between men and women ‘on account of sex.’”57  Thus, to hold 
that marriage is a form of sex discrimination under that provision would 
“subvert the purpose” of the amendment.58 
In addition, some states specifically disavowed any intention to create a 
right to same-sex marriage when they enacted their ERA.  Such was the case in 
Florida, where official commentary noted that the language of the amendment 
was adopted so that “the proposal would not be deemed in any way to 
countenance same-sex marriages.”59  Likewise, the Special Commission 
appointed to study the effects of the Massachusetts ERA, noted that it would 
have “no effect upon the allowance or denial of homosexual marriages.”60  A 
Virginia Attorney General’s opinion regarding the proposed ERA argued that 
the amendment would not require recognition of same-sex marriages.61 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The lack of legal support for the proposition that marriage is used as a 
form of sex discrimination, no less than the logical absurdity of the proposition 
will not likely prevent the argument from being raised in the future.  The 
temptation to gain a desired result by legal fiat rather than through the 
uncertain legislative process will likely be yielded to again as in the past.  
Notwithstanding, a careful consideration of the law will, I believe, make clear 
that courts ought to be hesitant to accept the argument for the sake of 
preserving the logic and integrity of marriage and of constitutional law. 
 
 57. Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1194 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974). 
 58. Id. 
 59. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2 commentary (West Supp. 2001). 
 60. SPECIAL COMMISSION AUTHORIZED TO STUDY THE EFFECT OF THE RATIFICATION OF 
THE PROPOSED [ERA] UPON THE LAWS, BUSINESS COMMUNITIES AND PUBLIC IN THE 
COMMONWEALTH, INTERIM REPORT, S. DOC. NO. 1689, at 20-21 (1976). 
 61. 154 Va. Op. Att’y Gen. 2 (1977); see also 84 Me. Op. Att’y Gen. 20 (1984). 
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